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Taxing and Trading 
in Corporate Energy 
Activities: Pioneering 
UK Reforms to Address 
Climate Change 
BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON 
School of Law, University of Manchester 
KIRI L. CHANWAI 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
Introduction: Energy and Economic 
Instruments 
The landscape of UK environmental law is 
changing rapidly, with important implications for 
British companies. In recent years, energy activ· 
ities have surfaced from the relative backwaters 
of UK environmental regulation to occupy the 
limelight. The reason is climate change. As the 
scientific prognosis of global warming firmed, 
and evidence of the likely economic and eco· 
logical ramifications became better understood, 
authorities in the UK and abroad have sought new 
policies and laws to stem greenhouse gas 
emissions. European Union (EU) and inter· 
national authorities have also come to regard our 
reliance on dirty fossil fuels and profligate energy 
consumption as the greatest threat to sustainable 
development because climate change will 
eviscerate many environmental processes-and 
the economic systems that depend on them-in a 
pervasive way.1 Most environmental problems in 
the UK so far have been dis~rete and specific-an 
unsightly motorway development here, a polluting 
factory there-quite unlike global warming, 
whose omnipresent effects will require compre· 
hensive and integrated policy packages hitherto 
largely unfamiliar to government administrators. 
The British Government is seeking to thwart 
rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions prin-
cipally by regulating energy activities, a difficult 
cross-sectoral strategy encompassing energy use 
in industry, transport, housing and other sectors, 
Carbon dioxide (C02) is the main culprit, in 1990 
1. For an overview of dangerous climate impacts in the 
UK, see M. Hulme, J. Tumpenny, and G. Jenkins, Climate 
· Change Scenarios for the United Kingdom: The UKCIP02 
Briefing Report (University of East Anglia, 2002). 
accounting for 79 per cent of all British GHG 
emissions, as against methane, contributing 10 
per cent, nitrous oxide an additional nine per 
cent, and smaller amounts from chemicals such 
as chlorofluorocarbons.2 The Government's Cli-
mate Change Programme of November 2000,3 co· 
ordinated by the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). sketches how 
the UK intends to meet its Kyoto Protocol com-
mitment of a 12.5 per cent reduction on 1990 
levels of all GHGs by 2012, and the achievement 
of the separate domestic goal of a 20 per cent cut 
in C0
2 
emissions below 1990 levels by 2010. The 
UK is one of the few OECD countries to have 
made real progress, with its GHG emissions 14.5 
per cent below 1990 levels in 1999,4 achieved 
through the restructuring of the energy supply 
sector with the switch from coal to cleaner natural 
gas. Energy efficiency is twice that of the 1950s, 
meaning that the UK is producing more with 
less. But further gains of these magnitudes seem 
doubtful in the absence of radically new policies 
and tools, and robust economic growth in recent 
years threatens to increase GHG emissions 
again. 
Electricity generation is the single largest 
source of GHG emissions. The UK's electricity 
consumption jumped by 16 per cent from 1990 to 
1999, although coi emissions declined because of 
the "dash for gas" and improved performance of 
nuclear generation.' The switch to gas was a one-
off event, and further GHG emission reductions 
must accrue by other means, such as harnessing 
renewable energies including wind and solar 
power. The Government admitted: "The UK's 
energy sector is still largely reliant on fossil fuels 
and, unless they can be replaced by plants with 
low or no emissions, this dependence will 
increase after 2010 as existing nuclear power 
stations reach the end of their licensed lifetimes. "6 
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP) recently advised that C02 reductions of 
60 per cent by 2050 are necessary if Britain is to 
avoid dangerous climate change.' The relative 
economic costs of this task may not however be 
so great: one study estimated the cost of achiev· 
ing the RCEP's goal as about only 0.02 per cent of 
2. Department of Environment. Food, Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), The UK's Third National Communication 
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (DEFRA, 2001), p.18. In all, the UK's 
GHG emissions in 1990 were 208.4 million tonnes of 
C02 equivalent (MtCe). 
3. Climate Change: The UK Programme (Stationery Office, 
2000), www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechongel 
cm4913/indexlindex.htm. 
4 . DEFRA (n.2, above) , p.5. 
5. ibid., p.19. 
6. ibid .. p.26. 
7. 1\venty-second Report from the Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution, Energy- The Changing 
Climate, Cm 4749 (June 2000). 
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GDP per year.8 Of course, significant technological, 
economic and regulatory changes are first necessary 
to achieve such a low carbon economy. 
The thrust of the Government's plan to promote 
energy efficiency and expand the role of renew-
ables is to re-orient corporate behaviour through 
economic instruments.9 The key policy tools for 
this task are the Climate Change Levy, a Carbon 
Emissions Trading System, and a structure for 
trading in renewable energy supply obligations. 
The Government's focus is the industry sector, 
although it accounts for a minority of Britain's 
GHG emissions: transport is the biggest scourge, 
accounting for about 34 per cent of final energy 
use, followed by households (29 per cent) industry 
and services (23 per cent) and agriculture (14 per 
cent).10 However even the targeting of industry has 
its limits. The Cabinet Office's recent PIU Energy 
Review declared: "there is a strong likelihood that 
the UK will need to make very large carbon emission 
reductions over the next century. However, it 
would make no sense for the UK to incur large 
abatement costs, harming its international com-
petitiveness, if other countries were not doing the 
same. "11 Climate change concerns, whilst salient, 
are also only one of several key issues informing 
UK energy policy, others being security of supplies, 
energy affordability and market competition. 
In many jurisdictions, including the UK, eco-
nomic instruments have become the championed 
policy tool for disciplining corporate energy use 
(and other environmental activities). As early as 
1992 the UK Government boldly announced, "in 
future there will be a general presumption in 
favour of economic instruments".12 This commit-
ment was reaffirmed in the 1999 Sustainable 
Development Strategy, which stated: "The 
Government will explore the scope for using eco-
nomic instruments, such as truces and charges, to 
deliver more sustainable development. Such 
measures can promote change, innovation and 
efficiency, and higher environmental standards. "1~ 
The EU has also emerged as an enthusiastic 
proponent of market instruments. Its 1993-2000 
Fifth Environmental Action Programme called 
for a "broadening of the range of instruments",14 
8. Inter-departmental Analysts Group, Long Tenn Re-
duction in Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the UK (February 
2002). 
9. Cabinet Office, The Energy Review, Performance and 
Innovation Unit Report (Feb. 2002), p.1 
10. DEFRA (n.2, above), p.14. 
11. Cabinet Office (n.9, above), p.1. 
12. UK, This Common Inheritance. The Second Year 
Repon (Cmnd 2086) (Stationery Office, 1992), para.3.46. 
13. Department ofEnvironment, Transport and Regions 
(DETR), A Better Quality of Life: A Strotegy for Sustain· 
able Development for the UK (DETR, 1999), para.5. 7. 
14. European Commission, Fifth Environmental Action 
Programme, Towards Sustainability: A European Com-
munity Programme of Policy and Action in Relation lo 
the Environment and Sustainable Development (Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
1992), p.101 . 
and in 1997 the European Commission published 
a Communication on Environmental Taxes and 
Charges in the Internal Market.15 
There is a flourishing academic literature on 
economic instruments as a means of environmental 
policy. Economic theorists posit that environmental 
taxes will impose lower costs on developers to 
achieve a given level of pollution reduction than 
conventional emission control regulations. 16 
Efficient businesses will seek to lower their tax 
burden by investing in clean production tech-
nologies where this is cost effective.17 In this way, 
environmental truces can give polluters an ongoing 
incentive to seek more efficient ways (for example, 
technological innovations or recycling), to reduce 
emissions, whereas there is little financial incen-
tive to do better once prescribed emission stand-
ards are met under conventional regulations.18 
In contrast, where truces set a "price" on use of 
the environment and rely on markets to effect 
corresponding behavioural changes towards the 
desired environmental standard, tradeable emission 
permits flow from a governmental determination 
of the environmental standard in the form of 
an emissions "cap" and then rely on market forces 
to price and allocate the distributed tradeable 
emission rights.19 The creation of exclusive and 
transferable pollution rights in theory provides 
businesses with an incentive to use environ-
mental entitlements efficiently.20 Trading allows 
polluters to tailor their regulatory burdens by 
transferring the burdens to where they can be 
borne most cheaply, thus allowing society to obtain 
the same level of overall environmental protection 
at a lower cost. 
Climate Change Levy: the structure 
Levy rates and affected sectors 
Although the UK previously objected to EU pro-
posals flagged in the early 1990s for a European 
carbon tax, fearing loss of control over national 
15. COM(97), February 9, 1997. 
16. R. Repetto, et al., Wasting Assets. National Resources 
in the Notional Income Accounts (World Resources 
Institute, 1989), pp.7-8. 
17. ibid., p.7. 
18. R. Stavins and B. Whitehead, "Dealing with Pollution: 
Market-based Incentives for Environmental Protection" 
(1992) 34(7) Environment 7 at 30. 
19. The literature on this subject is extensive: see, 
e.g. T.H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in 
Refonning Pollution Policy (Resources for the Future, 
1985); S. Beder, "Charging the Earth: The Promotion of 
Price-based Measures for Pollution Control" (1996) 16(2) 
Ecological Economics 51. 
20. D.A. Malueg, "Emission Credit Trading and the 
Incentive to Adopt Ne\1 Pollution Abatement Tech-
nology" (1989] 16 /ournal of Environmenjal Economics 
and Management 52. 
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taxation policy,=1 in April 2001 the Governm~nt 
introduced its own tax as a means of enablmg 
Britain to achieve its emission reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 22 When plans for the 
Climate Change Levy (CCL) were mooted in 1999, 
the proposal not surprisingly received a hostile 
reception from various businesses, especially the 
energy intensive chemical and steel industries. 23 
Consequently, the Levy was eventually intro-
duced as a modest charge whose impact would be 
softened by various financial concessions and 
benefits. 
Implemented through the Finance Act 2000, 
the CCL applies to energy used by industry and 
the public sector, but not to energy consumed in 
households, transportation or registered charities. 
Also exempt are small businesses using limited 
amounts of energy below specified thresholds. 
Further, horticulturalist businesses, recognised by 
the government as a "special case" high energy 
user, enjoy a 50 per cent discount on the Levy for 
up to five years. Not all fuels are taxed. Renew-
able energy (with the exception of large-scale 
hydropower greater than lOMWJ is exempt from 
the CCL, so as to provide an incentive for businesses 
to opt for non-fossil fuel sourced electricity. 
Suppliers of exempt renewable energies must 
hold a Levy Exemption Certificate, issued by the 
Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). 
Also exempt is good quality combined heat and 
power (CHP), which is a low carbon energy form, 
fuels used as a feedstock, and electricity used in 
electrolysis processes (for example, in aluminium 
smelting). Electricity from nuclear power, although 
not a fossil fuel, is subject to the CCL-arguably 
an appropriate measure given that nuclear power 
poses its own environmental problems (for example, 
treatment of radioactive waste) and to exempt 
nuclear energy could have encouraged more 
investment in this sector at the expense of the 
fledgling renewables market. The CCL does not 
apply to oils already subject to excise duties. 
The current CCL rates are 0.15 p/kWh for gas, 
coal and coke, 0.43 p/kWh for electricity and 
0.07 p/kWh for LPG, and the Levy is set to rise 
year-on-year, althqugh no rise was made on its 
2002 anniversary. The CCL is added to energy 
consumers' bills before VAT and shown as a 
separate item. 
21. D. Maddison end D. Pearce, "The UK and Global 
Warming Policy", UK Environmental Pa/icy in the 1990s, 
in T.S. Gray (ed), UK Environmental Policy in the 1990s 
(Macmillan, 1995), 123 at 138-139. 
22. See S.A. Price, "Environmental Taxation: The U.K.'s 
Proposed Climate Change Levy" [1999] 12 Opinion 335. 
23. B. Church, "Climate Change Levy-Hot Air or Cold 
Comfort?" (2001) 29(12) Energy Policy 947. 
Levy concessions and off-setting 
entitlements 
The CCL was advanced on a roughly revenue neutral 
basis, to be offset by a 0.3 per cent reduction in all 
employers' national insurance contributions (NICs). 
The scheme also includes the sweetener of an 
80 per cent Levy rebate for those energy intensive 
industries participating in a Climate Change 
Agreement to meet targets for improving energy 
efficiency or reducing emissions. The CCL's finan-
cial impact is further assuaged by the enhanced 
capital allowances (ECAs) scheme, whereby 
investment in specific energy efficient products 
(for example, pipe-work insulation and thermal 
screens) enables companies to reclaim 100 per 
cent of the capital allowance in the first year. 
The ECAs are administered by the Carbon lhlst, 
established in April 2001 as an independent, 
non-profit-making company to recycle some 
£150 million of CCL receipts over three years to 
quicken the adoption of low carbon technologies. 
The Trust's remit extends to provision of advice 
and information, research and demonstration 
projects. Overall, the CCL package promises a 
wonderful synergy of more energy efficiency, jobs 
growth through investment in renewables and the 
stimulus of NIC reductions, but without draining 
businesses' finances. 
The main way energy hungry companies can 
manage their levy liability and improve environ-
mental performance is through participation in the 
Climate Change Agreements (CCAs). An 80 per 
cent discount from the Levy is available to 
companies that pursue challenging targets for 
improving energy efficiency or reducing carbon 
emissions through agreements negotiated between 
their relevant sector trade associations and DEFRA. 
The scheme is restricted to "energy intensive" 
industries, as defined in Schedule 1 to the 
Pollution Prevention and Control (England and 
Wales) Regulations 2000, and agreements operate 
until March 31, 2013. To date, umbrella agreements 
with 44 trade associations have been concluded, 
each association covering a plethora of individual 
businesses and some 8,000 industrial sites in 
all. Examples include the Brewers and Licensed 
Retailers Association; British Cement Association; 
Society of Motor Manufacturers and 'Ifaders Ltd; 
UK Steel (Environmental) Limited; Food and 
Drink Federation; and British Apparel and Textiles 
Confederation. 
The CCAs do not specify how businesses 
should achieve energy reduction and efficiency 
performance targets; rather, they detail the goals 
and methods for calculating performance, and 
reporting and verification protocols.24 Each sector 
24. See, e.g. Sch.2, Umbrella Climate Change Ag~ee· 
ment for the Food And Drink Sector, March 2001. 
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bas a target and a set of two-yearly milestones when 
performance is reviewed. Failure to meet agreed 
targets results in the Levy rebates being suspended 
or withdrawn. Parties that exceed their targets 
may trade their "credits" in the government's emis-
sion allowance trading scheme, and may purchase 
allowances if necessary to meet target shortfalls. 
Implementation of the Levy 
Assessing the overall financial and environmental 
impact of the Levy, the picture after 18 months is 
inauspicious. During its first year, the CCL was 
reported to be a net burden on the public purse.25 
It was predicted to raise about £1 billion, but only 
generated £551 million whilst the government 
returned to businesses £1.05 billion in reduced 
employers' NICs (and the NIC reductions are dis-
tributed to all companies, regardless of whether 
they are subject to the Levy). On the environmental 
criterion, according to DEFRA, C02 emissions 
actually rose by 1.5 per cent in 2001, supposedly 
due to more coal usage in power stations in 
response to higher gas prices. 28 The Government 
estimated that the CCL package (including CCAs, 
etc.) would save 5 MtCe per year by 2010.2 7 The 
Energy Minister, Brian Wilson, has since admitted 
that at this stage it appears unlikely that Britain 
will reach its stepping-stone target of 5 per cent of 
electricity generated from renewables by the end 
of 2003.28 
Much of the current debate about the future 
of the CCL has focused on the economic impacts 
in the private sector. Prior to its adoption, a sen-
sational report by Business Strategies predicted 
the Levy would result in the shedding of 156,000 
jobs over 10 years.29 Other key worrying forecasts 
were a decline in UK manufacturing productivity 
by 0.8 per cent and a weakening of UK businesses' 
international competitiveness. Interestingly, the 
UK steel, chemical and engineering industry associ-
ations, sponsored the report. Various trade and 
industry periodicals also carried similar alarmist 
predictions.30 More recently, Church argued that 
as UK companies had already made great strides 
in improving their energy and materials efficiency 
in order to stay in business, the Levy would push 
many firms at the margins of solvency over 
the edge.31 Such bold views however ignore that 
25. P. Firth, "Money lo Bum", (5 July 2002) 18(5) 
Utility Week 18. 
26. Cited in ibid. 
27. DEFRA (n.2, above). p.30. 
28. R. Milne, "Green Energy Target Problem", (May 17, 
2002) 17(20) Utility Week 13. 
29. Business Strategies Ltd, The Climate Change Levy 
-Impact on the UK Economy Uuly 1999). 
30. See, e.f. D. Howell, "Climate of Fear" (2000) 13(17) 
Professiona Engineering 38; Anonymous, "Climate Levy 
Cost Rises" (2001) 127(1290) Accountancy 15. 
31. Church (n.23, above). 
carbon taxes already exist in the Scandinavian 
countries and other EU states and various non-
European states are advancing new carbon taxes, 
such as New Zealand. n Existing academic 
research on the economic effects of carbon taxes 
is also equivocal. 33 
Other studies highlighted possible regional and 
sector specific effects of the Levy. The chemical, 
plastics and steel industries are among industry 
sectors commentators predicted would be maligned 
by the CCL because of their high-energy needs 
and low staffing.34 By contrast, the services sector 
would be relatively unaffected and possibly even 
benefit because services such as hotels, catering 
and retailing are labour intensive with weak trade 
connections to the manufacturing industry. How-
ever, such differences do not seem to account for 
the fact that energy intensive industries are eligible 
to receive an 80 per cent CCL rebate by participating 
in the CCAs. Apart from differential industry 
sector effects, there are also possible geographical 
variations in the impact of the CCL. Business 
Strategies predicted such regional disparities, 
with northern British manufacturers to be dispro-
portionately affected because of their higher 
concentration of energy intensive companies 
(thus widening the "North-South" divide).35 
Recently, several studies have looked at the actual 
implementation of the Levy. SGS Consulting sur-
veyed 100 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
in 2002, and found that one in five enterprises 
were unaware that the Levy had come into force, 
and that almost one-quarter of firms did not under· 
stand the Levy's purpose or how its revenue was 
spent.36 One-half of SME manufacturers believed 
that the CCL would ultimately have a negative 
impact on their business and only one-quarter of 
respondents believed that the Levy would yield 
positive effects: The study found that 27 per cent 
of SMEs had implemented a programme to mon-
itor or manage their energy consumption, with 
installation of energy efficient lighting being the 
most popular method. SGS Consulting suggested 
special measures were needed in the CCL package 
to directly target and assist SMEs given that 
because of their size they have less access to the 
32. A. Barenzini, J. Goldemberg, S.A. Speck, .. A Future 
for Carbon Taxes" (2000) 32(3) Ecological-Economics 
395; Minister for Energy, P. Hodgson, "Climate Change 
Policy: Early Decisions and Directions", Media State-
ment (August 30, 2002). 
33. See, e.g. C. Kemfert end H. Welsch, "Heinz Energy· 
Capital-Labor Substitution and the Economic Effects of 
C02 Abatement" (2000) 22(6) Journal of Policy Madeling 
641; B.J. Heijdra and A. ven Der Horst, "Taxing Energy to 
Improve the Environment: Efficiency end Distributional 
Effects" (2000) 148(1) De Economist 45. 
34. See, e.g. P. Gander, "Plastics Under Strain from 
Climate Levy" {2002) 77(4) Food Manufacture 18. 
35. Business Strategies (n.29, above). 
36. SGS Consulting, 011e Year On: The Impact of 
the Climate Change Levy on Manufacturi'}g SMEs (June 
2002). 
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CCL agreements or access to exempt CHP-derived 
electricity. 37 
A second survey, conducted by London 
Electricity, of professionals working in the energy 
industry revealed that 42 per cent of respondents 
felt the CCL had led to a net increase in their 
business's costs and 33 per cent did not believe 
that the CCL had prompted new energy manage-
ment initiatives. 33 In terms of renewable energy 
information, 60 per cent of respondents agreed 
that more guidance was needed on how to obtain 
and utilise green energy. A third, more detailed 
study on the CCL, conducted by the Federation 
of Small Businesses, also suggested the Levy is 
having a discriminatory impact on small firms.39 
It found that 66 per cent of SMEs are better off 
because they benefit from the NIC reduction whilst 
remaining under the CCL exemption threshold. 
Of the 34 per cent of SMEs subject to the Levy, 
FSB concluded that 88 per cent were financially 
worse off.4° The FSB study saw the likely losers of 
the CCL being SMEs involved in plastics process-
ing, hospitality and certain retailers. It gave as an 
example a plastic moulding company employing 
35 staff that was unable to participate in a CCL 
Agreement and incurred a net loss of £6,875 due 
to the CCL in its first year of operation.41 The study 
was critical of the additional costs of participating 
in the CCL Agreements, namely membership and 
joining fees.42 
Generally, existing studies emphasise that 
certain business sectors are worse off from the 
Levy, although overall the economic burden and 
dislocation is modest. Information from the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry showed that the Levy 
added 0.9 per cent to the monthly input prices 
index for materials and fuels in April 2001-hardly 
a staggering impact, and one offset by the recycling 
of levies to industry through, inter alia, reduced 
NICs and the ECAs.43 In evaluating the effect of 
the CCL on energy prices, it should also be seen in 
the context of the not insignificant declines in 
electricity prices in recent years: enhanced com-
petition in energy markets resulted in industrial 
electricity prices in the UK falling by some 20 per 
cent during the late 1990s.44 Regarding possible 
changes, the Levy scheme could be amended to 
recycle all CCL receipts into energy efficiency 
grants and similar investments rather than 
offering blanket NIC reductions to businesses 
37. ibid., pp.10-11. 
38. London Electricity, Climate Change Levy Report 
(June 2002). 
39. Federation of Small Businesses, The Climate Change 
Levy. Another Cost for Small Businesses (July 2002). 
40. ibid .• p.6. 
41. ibid .• p.24. 
42. ibid., p.12. 
43. Anonymous, "Climate Levy Price Rise Less Than 
Feared" (May 24, 2001) Supply Management 8. 
44. DEFRA (n.2, above), p.14. 
generally.45 Also, it seems authorities could do 
more to impart information to affected industries 
on the structure of the Levy and its rationale, as 
well as further investigation of possible new 
concessionary arrangements for SMEs. Perhaps 
the most crucial issue that will shape the success 
of the Levy, is whether there will be sufficient 
green energy supply to meet the growing demand 
from businesses wishing to reduce Levy 
payments. If businesses lack alternatives to fossil 
fuels, then the Levy may end up being treated as just 
another tax to be grudgingly paid. The question 
of expanding supply of renewable energies is 
considered later in this article. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
Emissions trading framework 
The CCL is not a discrete policy mechanism, but 
is part of a package of climate change response 
instruments. Another key mechanism is the Emis-
sion Trading Scheme (ETS), which is also likely to 
feed into the wider EU environmental trading 
market proposed. In March 2002 the Commission 
released a Proposal for a Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community.45 The draft Directive 
covers just carbon emissions, on the basis that they 
amount to 80 per cent of the EU's CHG emissions, 
and trading would be open only to major indus-
trial facilities. If adopted, the Directive would 
empower EU Member States to grant polluters 
carbon allowances, within allocated national 
allowances, which would be traded among eligible 
businesses across the EU. 
As with the EU's plans, the UK's motivations 
are to enable industry and regulators to gain early 
experience on the technicalities of emissions 
trading pending commencement of global-wide 
trading under the auspices of the Kyoto Proto-
col. The allocation of exclusive and transferable 
pollution rights in theory gives firms an incentive 
to use their environmental entitlements in the most 
cost-effective manner tailored to each company's 
operational requirements.47 The UK's ETS is a 
pilot, voluntary initiative, which went live on 
April 2, 2002 and will operate in its first phase 
until December 31, 2006. The Government believes 
the ETS could deliver annual emissions savings 
45. L. Cork, "Levy Charges Ahead" (June 2001) 54(6) 
Works Management 20. 
46. COM(2001) 0581. 
47. D.A. Malueg, "Emission Credit Trading and the 
Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Tech· 
nology" (1989) 16 Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 52. 
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of between 0.8 to 2 MtCe annually by 2010.45 
Its details were outlined in DEFRA's Framework 
for the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (August 
2001), which followed the Department's consul-
tation paper, A Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Trading Scheme for the United Kingdom (Novem-
ber 2000). Commitments that companies volunteer 
to assume derive largely from contract and 
general administrative power rather than new 
regulation. 49 The Government has established ~ 
process of mediation and adjudication to resolve 
any disputes between participants and DEFRA. 
The ETS is generally open to businesses 
and other organisations in the UK responsible 
for GHG emissions. A new Emissions Trading 
Authority, under the wing of DEFRA, oversees the 
administration of the ETS including responsibility 
for managing the Registry,50 which records ETS 
participants' emission targets and trades. The ETS 
participants have ·several means of meeting their 
emission assigned targets. They can reduce their 
own emissions through in-house operational and 
material changes, and sell any excess allowances 
or bank them for future contingencies. Alterna-
tively, if companies will exceed their target they 
may purchase the necessary additional emission 
allowances from other ETS participants. Overall, 
the scheme should reduce the total quantity of 
emissions among ETS participants over the period 
2002 to 2006 by the descending emission cap 
targets set annually. According to. DEFRA, this will 
give "all participants ... a direct incentive to 
innovate and invest in new technologies to reduce 
their costs of complying with targets" .51 
Trading participants 
There are several ways companies may join the 
ETS. The main way is as a "Direct Participant", 
whereby firms volunteer to take on absolute targets 
for one or more sources in return for financial in-
centive payments if the agreed targets are reached. 
The "sources" Direct Participants may enter into 
the Scheme could be an entire factory complex, 
but excluded sources that cannot be entered in-
clude direct emissions from electricity generation, 
emissions from facilities already covered by a 
Climate Change Agreement and emissions from 
households. Companies may only participate 
through this route if they have successfully bid for 
the emission reduction targets and the financial 
incentive payments distributed at the auction.52 
48. DEFRA (n.2, above), p.31. 
49. Environmental Protection Act 1990, s.153, provides 
the legal basis for the incentive payments to participating 
organisations. 
50. See www.defra.gov.ukletr. 
51. DEFRA, Fromework for the UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme (DEFRA, August 2001), p.6. 
52. For details of the auction process, ibid., pp.15-16. 
The share of the incentive payments was deter-
mined by the government-administered auction 
held on March 11-12, 2002.53 As a result of the 
auction, 34 companies signed up to the ETS, 
including: Asda, Barclays, British Airways, BP, 
Dupont UK, Ford Motor Company, Lend Lease 
Real Estate, Rolls Royce, Shell UK and Tesco. The 
average emission reduction targets set by the auction 
was 11 per cent below participants' historic base-
line emissions, which according to DEFRA would 
save about 1.1 MtCe of emissions that would other-
wise occur.54 Further auctions may be held to 
enable other companies to enter the ETS. In the 
auction, companies that wished to participate in 
the ETS bid for a share of the £215 million incentive 
payments by specifying the reduction in annual 
emissions they would make from their historic 
emissions baseline by the end of 2006. The reduc-
tion in annual emissions was then divided into 
five equal annual targets over 2002 to 2006. Each 
Direct Participant was allocated at the beginning 
of each year emission "allowances" (i.e., unit of 
trade) equal to their capped emissions target for 
that year. Emission allowances were denominated 
in C0
2 
or its equivalent. Thus, to illustrate hypo-
thetically, a Direct Participant with a baseline 
of 1,000 tonnes of C0
2 
equivalent (tC02e) that 
successfully bid in the auction for 100 tC02e, 
must then reduce its emissions by 100 tC02e 
at the rate of 20 tC0
1
e each year over five years. If 
the final clearing price at the auction was £20 per 
tC0
2
e, the Direct Participant would receive £400 
per annum of incentive payments each year 
for achieving its emission reduc~on target or 
£2,000 over five years. 
Successful bidders formalised their commit-
ments through an agreement with the DEFRA 
Secretary of State, whereby they agreed to comply 
with the rules of the Scheme, such as in relation 
to emissions reporting." Participants that fail to 
meet their annual emission targets (after the three-
month "reconciliation period" where participants 
are given time to put their house in order by 
purchasing if necessary additional allowances to 
make up any shortfall), not only forfeit their 
incentive payment, but will have their following 
year's allocation of emission allowances reduced 
by a factor of 1.3 of the amount emissions exceeded 
the target. The Government has also indicated that 
it may introduce statutory fines for breaches.56 
There are other routes by which an organ-
isation may join the ETS. The main alternative is 
through an existing target set through a Climate 
53. DEFRA, "Auction Success for UK Emissions Trading 
Scheme", Press Release (March 13, 2002): www.defra. 
gov. uk/newsl 2002/02313c.htm. 
54. ibid. 
55. For a copy of the slandard agreement, see www. 
defra.gov.uklenvironmentlclimatechangelpdfltroding/pdfl 
trodingdp_agreement. ' 
56. DEFRA (n.51, above), p.33. 
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Change Agreement (CCA). Rather than receive 
emission allowances up-front via the auction 
process, "Agreement Participants" (as they are 
known) may receive emission allowances at the 
end of each "milestone year" (a biennial period) 
for the amount by which they exceed their CCA 
target. If they miss their target, they could also 
purchase additional allowances to make up for 
the shortfall. Importantly, Agreement Participants 
cannot benefit from the ETS financial incentive 
payments for emissions that benefit from the CCL 
discount, but a company in a CCA may still bid 
through auctions for financial incentive in relation 
to their emissions not covered by the CCA targets. 
Companies may also enter the ETS as Project 
Participants.57 By this route, companies undertake 
specific UK-based emissions reduction projects 
and sell any resulting emission credits to other 
participants in the Scheme. The details of this 
method of entry are still being formulated by 
DEFRA. At this stage, carbon sequestration pro-
jects (for example, afforestation activities) would 
not be eligible projects because of "complexities 
and uncertainties" involved in measuring carbon 
sequestration from forestry activities.58 Finally, it 
is also open to anyone to open an account in the 
Registry to trade allowances even though they are 
not a polluter. Accordingly, an environmental non-
govemment organisation could open a trading 
account to purchase emission allowances in the 
market and then cancel them.~9 
Traded allowances are deemed to be revenue 
items for tax purposes. Thus, companies purchasing 
allowances will receive tax relief on the cost, and 
companies that make profits from the sale of allow-
ances will be taxed. The Government has stated 
that it does not consider trading in allowances 
to be an investment activity regulated under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, although 
dealing in derivatives on allowances would amount 
to a regulated investment activity.llO 
Trading in renewable energies 
The renewables obligation 
Apart from the ETS, the other mainstay of the 
Government's climate change policy is the Renew-
ables Obligation (RO). It commenced on April 1, 
2002, by statutory order made pursuant to the 
Electricity Act 1989 and the Utilities Act 2000, 
and is supervised by Ofgem.81 It obliges UK 
57. ibid .. p.35. 
58. ibid. 
59. ibid .• p.25. 
60. ibid., p.37 
61. For details of the RO scheme, see The Renewables 
Obligation Order 2000, SI 2002/914. The Utilities Act, 
s .62, provided for the amendment of the Electricity Act 
1989, s.32, to enable the Secretary of State to impose 
electricity suppliers to increase their provision 
of renewable energy supply to 10.4 per cent by 
April 2010, and there are stepping stone targets 
beginning with 3 per cent by March 2003.62 The 
RO initiative is one way the UK Government is 
seeking to meet umbrella energy targets set by the 
EU. The 1997 EU White Paper on renewable 
energy envisaged doubling renewable generation 
in the EU by 2010.83 The 2001 EU Renewables 
Directive has specified indicative targets for each 
Member State.64 The EU has adopted two targets 
for renewable energy-a 12 per cent target for 
renewable energy as a percentage of total energy 
consumption, and a 22.1 per cent target for re-
newable electricity as a percentage of total elec-
tricity consumption.65 The UK Government has 
endorsed these targets,58 not merely due to climate 
change considerations, but also to promote 
national energy security given predictions that 
Britain may need to rely increasingly on imports 
to fuel its burgeoning economy.57 
Under the RO scheme, which has replaced the 
ineffectual Non-Fossil Fuel Orders,81 suppliers in 
compliance with their green energy quota are 
issued a Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC). 
Ofgem is responsible for assessing and monitoring 
the extent of compliance by suppliers. Most renew-
able energy sources (for example, wind and solar} 
may be used to meet the RO, except energy from 
waste and large-scale hydropower. If a supplier 
cannot meet the RO, it can buy out a fee to Ofgem 
for each MWh short, cUITently set at £30 per MWh, 
or purchase ROCs from other suppliers willing to 
trade them as permitted by the Utilities Act. 
Energy supply companies may pass on the costs 
of purchasing renewable electricity to their 
customers; recent retail electricity prices suggest 
the RO has added 3 per cent to consumers' elec-
tricity bills. 89 The money collected by Of gem from 
penalties is paid back to suppliers in proportion 
to how much renewable electricity they have 
sourced. Thus, the mechanism provides an in-
centive to invest in renewables, as suppliers will 
receive more money from the penalty fund and 
obligations in connection with electricity from renew-
able sources. 
62. ibid .. Sch.1. 
63. European Commission, Energy for the Future: 
Renewable Sources of Energy, COM(97)599 final, 
(November 26, 1997). 
64. Directive 2001/77, On the promotion of electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources in the internal 
electricity market, September 27, 2001. 
65. Directive 2001/77, Art.3(4). 
66. Cabinet Office (n.9, above), p.1. 
67. House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee, 
Security of Energy Supply (HC 364). 
68. In relation to this scheme and its problems, see 
House of Commons, Select Committee on Environmental 
Audit, A Sustainable Energy Strategy? Renewables and 
the PIU Report (July 2002). p.42. 
69. Anonymous, "Electricity Suppliers Hike Prices to 
Pay for Environmental Obligations" (April 11, 2002] 
25(15) Marketing Week (UK), 6. 
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will not have to pay as much into it. The RO 
scheme is a long-terni measure, with obligations 
in place for 25 years and with the size of the 
obligation open to being increased progressively.70 
The environmental effects of the RO scheme 
could be significant, saving some 2.5 MtCe emis-
sions by 2010 if properly implemented.71 Already, 
an increasing number of electricity suppliers are 
offering "green options", such as Powergen {offer-
ing totally green power contracts) and British 
Energy (offering partial green power deals).72 Yet, 
much work needs to be done to realise this target. 
Currently, only about 2.6 per cent of the UK's 
electricity (4,869 MWh) is derived from renew-
able sources, the bulk of which comes from large-
scale hydroelectric plants.73 The HCEAC74 believes 
the Government will achieve only 5 per cent of 
total electricity generation from renewables by 
2010 at current rates, and it disclosed that in 2001 
there was actually a slight fall from 2.8 per cent 
to 2.6 per cent (primarily due to less production 
from small hydropower plants). The UK ranks 
near the bottom among EU States in terms of 
renewable energy generation, reflecting an historic 
lack of support for renewables compared to 
Germany, Denmark and Sweden, among others.75 
Although the UK has extensive potential renew-
able energy sources {especially wind power 
in Scotland), the HCEAC has cautioned, "such 
estimates do not take full account of the costs of 
developing and utilising the resource, or of the 
technical constraints faced".78 
Barriers to expanding renewable energy 
supplies 
Nor do such energy supply estimates allow for the 
institutional and regulatory barriers to investment 
in green energy ventures. These barriers include 
planning legislation, the structure of the electricity 
grid, and the New Electricity Trading Arrange-
ments. Because renewable energy projects may 
interfere with wildlife movement, generate noise 
or visual pollution, and disturb local environ-
ments during project construction, such projects 
are regulated under the Town and Country Plan-
ning Act 1990. Project approval must accord with 
the relevant local development plan, and certain 
large-scale projects or developments in sensitive 
70. A. Lloyd. "The UK Renewable Obligation" (20011 
5(1) Power Economics 21. 
71. See Lattice Group. at www.goshelp.co.uk. 
72. A. Horstead, "April Falls" [April 26, 2002) 17(17) 
Utility Week 14. 
73. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Energy 
Trends (DTI. June 2002). p.25. 
74. HCEAC (n.68, above), para.51. 
75. See B. Richardson, "European Energy Law: New 
Measures for Sustainable Development" (2002) 4(13) 
Butterworths Resource Management Bulletin 150. 
76. HCEAC (n.68, above), para.15. 
areas require a formal environmental impact assess-
ment before permission can be granted.77 Obtain-
ing development permission from responsible 
local government authorities is emerging as a 
major obstacle to the increased deployment of 
renewables, especially for on-shore wind power 
farrns.78 According to HCEAC, the success rate of 
planning applications for renewable projects in 
England and Wales has to date been only about 26 
per cent, although better rates of success have 
occUITed in Scotland.79 Opposition to renewable 
energy projects has come from local communities 
(concerned about interference with visual 
amenities) and public bodies such as the Ministry 
of Defence (concerned that wind farms interfere 
with low flying aircraft and radar sites). Whilst 
the cUITent statutory guidance, Planning Policy 
Guidance 22, Renewable Energy (1993), supports 
the environmental benefits of increasing renew-
able energy generation, it is short on specifics on 
how to implement more such projects through the 
planning system. The solution to such problems 
requires more than mere policy guidance, but 
amendments to planning legislation to allow fast-
track approvals for certain types of priority renew-
able energy projects, coupled with clear regional 
targets quickly incorporated into local govern-
ment plans to facilitate project approvals. 
The connection of power generated from 
renewable energy projects to the electricity grid 
also appears to be a source of concern. The Utilities 
Act 2000 separated the electricity supply function 
from the distribution network function. It is a 
grid structure that tends to benefit. large energy 
suppliers, such as nuclear stations and coal/gas 
plants, which have economies of scale and market 
leverage. There are also ancillary technological 
barriers to securing optimal grid access for renew-
able energy suppliers. Wind farms, CHP plants 
and certain other energy generators require a sys-
tem able to accommodate small and intermittent 
sources on the distribution network. This requires 
the distribution network operators to manage 
networks to facilitate "embedded generation", 
whereby small generators can enjoy flexible dis-
tribution and local connections.80 Ofgem is ex-
ploring new arrangements to facilitate small green 
energy suppliers' market access, such as reduced 
or flexible grid connection charges, although 
concrete solutions have yet to be adopted. 
Another problematic feature of electricity 
networks is the UK's New Electricity Trading 
Arrangements (NETA). NETA was introduced on 
77. As specified by the Town and Country Planning 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1999. 
78. See G. Hartnell, Renewabler-Post NFFO Contracts 
(Norton Rose, 2002); OXERA Environmental, Regional 
Renewable Energy Assessments (OXERA, 2002), pp.4-5, 
35-36. 
79. HCEAC (n.68, above), p.58. 
80. ibid., paras 92- 94. 
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March 27, 2001, replacing the Electricity Pool 
as the wholesale electricity market for England 
and Wales. Under NETA, electricity suppliers and 
generators trade forward through bilateral con-
tracts, and penalties are imposed where demand 
exceeds contracted levels or generation falls short 
of it. Through these market reforms, NETA sought 
to stimulate genuine competition into wholesale 
electricity trading and provide price reductions 
for consumers. Concerns are emerging regarding 
the adverse impact NETA is having on small and 
intermittent electricity generators, which comprise 
many renewable energy suppliers. 81 For small 
energy generators, whose supplies may be vari-
able and less reliable, there is a danger of breach-
ing contracted supply levels and so incurring 
heavy financial penalties. The problem for wind, 
for example, is that if generators offer to supply and 
the wind subsides, the supplier has to buy in the 
open "spot" market, which can result in expensive 
purchases. 
According to Ofgem, NETA is already driving 
down prices in England and Wales with annual 
contracts agreed by large industrial customers in-
volving prices some 10 to 15 per cent on last year, 
and down 35 per cent over the last two years. 82 An 
electricity market that generates on-going, sizeable 
price reductions for businesses and households 
may be economically welcome, but it is also a 
market that can dampen the incentives to use 
energy more frugally and efficiently. It is a market 
at odds with climate change policy if such con-
sumption is of fossil fuels. In the absence of a 
much larger renewable energies market and a much 
larger margin of difference between the retail 
price of green and brown energy, the electricity 
market deregulation reforms may undermine 
the Government's initial GHG emission control 
mechanisms. 
Conclusions 
Several important lessons are emerging from 
current UK reforms to control GHG emissions. 
First, the effectiveness of the Climate Change 
Levy requires complementary measures to re-
inforce the financial incentives conveyed to 
promote energy efficiency and reduce use of fossil 
fuels. The Emissions 'Ii'ading Scheme, the Enhanced 
Capital Allowances, and the Renewables Obligation 
are some of these key complementary measures. 
However, it is clear that there remain various 
barriers to stimulating the renewable energies 
market despite the exemption of renewables from 
81 . See Ofgem, Report to the DTI on the Initial Impact 
of NETA on Smaller Generators (August 2001). 
82. See Ofgem. 1vww.ofgem.gov.uk/e/arch/ retadocsl 
golive_explained.pdf 
the Levy. Complex planning regulations, inflex-
ible local governments, and electricity grid struc-
tures are some of these barriers. These barriers 
are not insurmountable, but do need to be 
addressed soon in order to fully realise the poten-
tial of the Levy. 
Secondly, the current UK reform focus on 
corporate energy activities is inappropriately 
restrictive given that the largest, and growing 
sources, of fossil fuel emissions are the transport 
and household sectors. To avoid dangerous 
climate change, UK policy must more assertively 
target these sectors. The Government believes that 
its climate change programme, including the CCL 
and the ETS, will reduce carbon emissions in 
2010 by some 15 per cent below their 1990 levels, 
and all Kyoto GHG regulated emissions 23 per 
cent below 1990 levels.13 But beyond this time-
frame, the Government has admitted that, without 
new policy measures, GHG emissions (especially 
coil will bloat because of economic growth and 
the retirement of nuclear power stations.14 
Among the limited initiatives to address 
transport emissions, the Government released in 
2002 a 10-Year Plan of £180 billion new invest-
ment and public spending to cut traffic congestion 
and reduce pollution.85 The existing vehicle excise 
duty and company car tax reform also provided 
modest incentives to reduce private motoring.88 
Yet, the Government appears unwilling to engineer 
more radical reforms because of the threat of a 
political backlash from motoring groups, whose 
fuel price protests in 1999 caused the Govern-
ment to abandon the fuel duty escalator. There 
has been even less progress in the household sector, 
where social justice considerations have tended 
to mollify the Government from hiking energy 
charges that could disproportionately hurt poor 
families. So far the Government has been relying 
on soft, non-intrusive measures, including reduced 
VAT on home energy efficiency services and 
materials; subsidies on efficient gas central heat-
ing boilers; energy efficiency labelling schemes; 
end periodic promotional advertising campaigns 
on energy efficiency. 87 The Government is also 
making amendments to Building Regulations to 
spur energy efficiency building design.81 
Overall, the UK reforms are an admission of 
market failure in energy markets to address 
83. DEFRA (n.2, above), p.53. 
84. ibid., p.44. 
85. Department of Transport (DoTJ, 1h1nsport 2010-
The 10 Year Plan (DoT, 2001). 
86. Inland Revenue, "Protecting the Environment: 
Refonn of Company Car Taxation" (Inland Revenue, 
March 21, 2000). 
87. For example, the Energy Efficiency Commitment, 
and the Home Energy Efficiency Scheme: see further 
DEFRA (n.2, above). p.32 
88. See 1vww.safety.dtlr.gov.uklbregslcansultleeplindex. 
htm. 
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environmental issues like ·climate change. The 
essential challenge for the Government is to 
implement market correction instruments that 
can factor environmental costs into energy markets. 
Although the CCL is a pioneering step, this is 
largely new terrain for government reformers and 
it is very likely that the Levy, and other policy 
instruments, will be adjusted and fine-tuned as 
experience with economic instruments grows. For 
British companies, the regulations and incentives 
governing energy use are changing rapidly, but 
they are changes that do not necessarily entail 
competitive stifling taxes. Rather, off-setting tax 
reductions (for example, NICs} coupled with new 
market opportunities in the renewable energy 
and emission trading field, suggest these changes 
will, apart from the environmental benefits, be 
economically beneficial to the UK. Already, the 
United States is looking very isolated in its refusal 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, as Australia, Canada 
and other Western countries move to join the 
Protocol in response to pressures from domestic 
businesses that see green energy markets as a 
potentially profitable new domain.89 
89. "Kyoto Now a Possibility, Says Lonely PM'', 
Sydney Morning Herald (September 5, 2002), 2. 
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